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Abstract 
 
Many countries have been concerned recently whether government size and government debt have 
become large enough to encroach excessively on their private economic performance.  New Zealand, in 
contradistinction, has undergone a period of reversal over the past two decades in which both 
government size and the ratio of government debt to GDP have been reduced substantially.  This paper 
examines whether there has been a cost to government debt and government size in New Zealand and 
thus whether a policy of deliberate contraction would have been associated with an output premium. 
The analysis suggests that in the long run government size and private per capita output have had an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with the positive effect of government size peaking at close to thirty 
percent of GDP. In addition larger government debt is found to be associated with lower levels of private 
output.  Hence the contraction in government size and the debt ratio in New Zealand would have 
resulted in an output premium. After accounting for the process of convergence to the long run, the 
short run analysis suggests that the inverse relationship found between changes in government size and 
economic growth may be attributable more to the response of fiscal expenditure policy to unanticipated 
changes in growth than to the perverse effect of government expenditures on growth and output.  This 
reinforces the traditional expenditure role of fiscal policy while at the same time cautioning against any 
longer run spillover into larger government size and debt.  
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1. Introduction 
  Economists and policy makers have been concerned with the potentially negative effects of 
government size on the private economy from as early as Thomas Hobbes (1651) and Adam Smith 
(1776), but recent experience with fiscal instability following the 2007-2008 financial crisis has added 
government debt to the list of size related concerns.  The perceived inability or unwillingness of 
governments to fund expenditure levels from current taxes has led to the rapid growth of fiscal deficits 
that in turn have resulted in potentially unsustainable levels of government debt.  The burden of 
supporting that debt has then imposed on governments such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy levels of financial austerity that are widely viewed as weighing down the performance of their 
private economies.  In this paper I am interested in assessing whether or not a reduction in government 
expenditure size can increase private economic performance and whether or not government debt does 
impose a real output burden on the private economy. 
In the following pages I explore these questions in relation to New Zealand, chosen as one of the 
first countries to recognize and respond explicitly to these issues.  New Zealand academics and policy 
makers have for some time been worried over whether growing government size had interfered with 
their economic performance (Bairam, 1988; Scully, 1989, 1996; Grimes, 2003; and Cook, Schousboe and 
Law, 2011).  As was also the case with Canada, the rapid growth of government debt in the late 1980’s 
and early 1990’s led to a more specific concern with the potential burden and operational constraints 
imposed by growing debt levels. This led to the adoption of The New Zealand Fiscal Responsibility Act in 
1994 which established “principles of responsible fiscal management” designed to promote greater 
transparency in government’s short-run fiscal intentions while requiring the more explicit targeting of 
long term fiscal objectives. Coming to grips with these two size related concerns introduced a period of 
growing fiscal prudence that in turn led to a fall in levels of both government size and government debt.  
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Hence one question that can be asked of New Zealand is whether such prudence translates into an 
output premium. 
While policy interest in government size and economic performance is most often posed as the 
effect of government size on economic growth, for many countries, perhaps even most, there is no 
meaningful long run empirical relationship between these two measures.2  For most developed 
countries government size has only increased over the past century while economic growth has not, 
typically varying about a more or less constant mean.3 That a meaningful relationship is unlikely to arise 
between these time series can be illustrated most clearly diagrammatically, and this is done in Figure 1 
for New Zealand.  In the bottom diagram of that figure, the growth rate of private output per capita 
(GROWTH_PYPC)) is shown to vary more or less randomly about its long run mean of 1.1 per cent, while 
in the top diagram, central government size (GSIZE, left axis) is shown to rise more or less continuously 
from the early 1900’s through the 1990’s.4 Visually at least, it is government size and the level of private 
income per capita in the top diagram (PYPC, right axis) that appear related in their pattern of movement 
through time and thus offer a greater likelihood of being meaningfully interrelated.  In econometric 
terms, per capita economic growth appears to be stationary or I(0), while both the levels of private 
output per capita (PYPC) and government size (GSIZE) appear nonstationary or I(1).  In economic terms 
this suggests that a theory seeking to link performance with size should be structured in terms of the 
levels of these two variables. 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
The paper proceeds in Section 2 by discussing the channels by which government size and debt are 
expected to affect the level of private per capita output and then combines these hypotheses into a 
                                                          
2
 Government size is defined here as the share of total central government expenditures in GDP, while economic 
growth is defined as the rate of growth of private real output per capita D(LNPYPC).  
3
 On this see Ericsson, Irons and Tryon (2001) and Romero-Avila (2006). 
4
 As a fraction of GDP, New Zealand’s central government size rose from a little over 13 percent in 1890 to over 40 
percent in 1993 before falling back to 30 percent in the period immediately prior to the 2007/8 financial crisis.  
3 
 
 
model that can be estimated. The discussion highlights the expected inverted U-shaped relationship 
private output and size predicted by public choice theory, a shape that implies a unique government size 
that would maximize private output per capita.5 Section 3 discusses the variables used to test the 
derived hypotheses and presents the cointegration model that emerges as the result of these tests.  The 
results suggest that real output per capita in New Zealand would be maximized at a level of government 
size somewhat smaller than its current size.  Section 4 presents the short run - error correction version 
of the model.  This allows the results of our analysis to be compared to the New Zealand literature 
seeking to link government size with economic growth.  That discussion emphasizes the advantage of 
the error correction framework in its ability to separate shorter run fiscal policy changes in government 
expenditure unrelated to the long run issue of optimal government size from those short run changes in 
government size that reflect the process of convergence to an evolving long run size.  Section 5 presents 
a vector error correction model that allows interpretation of the negative short run effect arising 
between changes in government size and economic growth (usually found in the literature) as reflecting 
the short run countercyclical response of fiscal policy (both automatic and discretionary) to the business 
cycle.   Section 6 provides a simulation that explores the economic significance of the long run effects 
found in model and hence provides one measure of the output premium that followed New Zealand’s 
success in imposing a greater degree of fiscal responsibility.  Section 7 concludes the paper.  
  2. Channels of government influence and derivation of the estimating model 
To model New Zealand’s private sector, I assume that private output at time t,   , arises from an 
aggregate production function that depends on the services produced by physical capital,  , human 
capital,  , and labour force size,  , in combination with the provision of government services,      That 
is, 
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 I refrain from characterizing the tipping point or peak effect of government size on private output as the optimal 
size of government because such an optimal consideration should incorporate other dimensions of value besides 
output (such as redistribution) which may come at the cost of private output.  
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Ambiguity over the nature of government services, over the extent to which government services are 
concurrent rather than private, leads to the adoption of a more specific form to capture the way that 
government services interacts with the private economy.  Here our focus is on the hypothesis that the 
government affects private per capita output directly through its aggregate size relative to the overall 
economy, GSIZE = G/Y, and indirectly through the relative size of its outstanding debt, CGDebt = DG/Y.   
That is, 
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where              and     is central government debt. 
Increases in government size itself are viewed as producing two opposing effects on the output 
of the private sector.  Initial levels of government service are assumed to confer significant benefit to 
individuals first by providing security from internal and external harm.  Further increases generate larger 
levels of stability and predictability for individuals in their dealing with others through the provision of 
policing and legal services that in turn encourage greater volumes of trade and production (Coase, 1960; 
Becker, 1983; Wittman, 1995).  Moreover, to the extent that health, sanitation, social welfare, and 
research and development are provided directly or funded indirectly by the government sector, larger 
levels of government spending increase the quality of productive inputs and thus the output of the 
private sector (Dahlman, 1991; Thomson and Jensen, 2013).  Perhaps even more directly, the 
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 The absence of a log time series on labour force led to use of population and per capita measures.  
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government’s provision of capital goods such as roads, rail and air infrastructure provide inputs that 
complement private capital, enhancing private output (Karras, 1997; Sturm, Kuper and de Haan, 1998).  
It is then assumed that governments will undertake socially more productive projects first so that 
productivity is expected to fall as government size expands.  The opposing channel of influence 
recognizes that all government services must be financed so that as government grows in size ever 
larger levels of resources must be obtained from the private sector. Their acquisition through the 
taxation of inputs such as labour and capital and the differential taxation of uses of private income 
(savings versus different types of consumption) decreases private output by discouraging the supply of 
productive inputs and by distorting its provision (Stuart, 1984; Usher, 1986).  Thus as government size 
grows, the tax price of government services only increases.  This has led writers such as Grossman 
(1987), Scully (1989, 2000) and Facchini and Melki (2013) to argue that on net, larger government size 
must encounter diminishing returns and at some point reach a size where further increases will reduce 
rather than increase private output.7  In a similar way, and for any given level of government size, an 
increase in government debt as a proportion of Y, CGDebt, will require more resources to be raised from 
the private sector to service that debt.8  Even if interest payments to debt holders remain internal to the 
economy as a whole (so that there is no net wealth effect arising within the community) the incidence of 
higher tax collections creates an increasing disincentive to produce and accumulate which further harms 
both present and future production (Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2012).  
The two opposing effects of government size on private per capita output are illustrated in 
Figure 2 below where the level of government size that maximizes per capita private output is 
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 Theories directed at explaining why government size may become too large include Niskanen’s (1968) theory of 
the expansionary incentives of the government bureau, Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) median voter theory, and 
Buchanan and Tullock’s (1962) emphasis of common pool problems in modern democracies. 
8
 While some level of government borrowing is clearly productive in allowing the matching current investments 
with future benefits, Buchanan and Wagner (1977) use the short time horizons of legislators and presence of fiscal 
illusion in voters to argue for a democratic bias towards excessive levels of government debt. 
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illustrated.  Here increases in the stocks of physical and human capital per capita are viewed as shifting 
upwards the benefit curve while an increase in the size of government debt is viewed as tilting upwards 
(increasing at an increasing rate) the slope of the real cost of government size.  The latter effect would 
shift downwards the net benefit curve and thus reduce the level at which the marginal effect of 
government size on y/N falls to zero.  
---  insert Figure 2 about here --- 
Representing the   ( ) function as Cobb-Douglas, allowing for the separation of government’s 
impact into these two effects and taking logarithms, we can derive a linear form of the per capita 
production function as 
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where the     represent the output elasticities of the different factors influencing production. The 
specific hypothesis to be tested is whether government size is nonlinear in its effect on per capita output 
and if so, whether government size has grown so large as to reduce private per capita output.  This is 
tested for by using the quadratic form 
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Here the addition of the random error term,   , leads to our estimating model where 
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by the level of educational attainment. The predicted signs of the coefficient estimates are          
  and          and the tipping point for the effect of government size on per capita output can be 
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3. Applying the model and presenting the cointegration results 
The multiple channels by which government size can influence private output argue for the most 
inclusive measure of government size—total expenditure rather than the more narrowly focused 
consumption or investment expenditures—as the magnitude appropriate to test our hypothesis of 
government’s effects.  The public choice basis of the above model assumes that government will look 
across all the dimensions of government provision when deciding on expenditures, choosing to target 
levels of consumption, investment and transfers where they can be most productive.  From a purely 
political perspective, the productivity of additional spending would be measured in terms of expected 
votes or re-election potential.  But with effective political competition across political parties, what is 
most highly valued by voters will be translated into policies that produce higher votes and ultimately 
better electoral success.9 An expansion in government size would then be expected to produce a more 
or less simultaneous expansion across all dimensions of government service (taking into account the 
rising finance and deadweight costs of additional size).  In New Zealand, total central government 
expenditures comprise approximately ninety per cent of all government expenditures and have 
averaged over twenty three percent of GDP over the 1890 – 2011 time period.10   
  The specific data used in this study come from a variety of sources.  Government expenditure, 
real GDP and population appear in the long-run online database maintained by Statistics New Zealand 
for the years 1890 through 2002. This was updated through 2012 with more recent data from Statistics 
New Zealand (Infoshare) and the New Zealand Treasury.  All variables were converted into per capita 
terms and logarithmic form, the former indicated by the use of PC and the latter by the prefix LN(.).   The 
data used as control variables—N.Z. capital stock and levels of educational attainment--were obtained 
                                                          
9
 This appears in the probabilistic voting literature as the representation theorem. See Coughlin (1994) and Winer 
and Ferris (2008). 
10
 The corresponding measure of economic performance is private per capita output, PYPC, measured in 2000 NZ 
dollars. By subtracting real government expenditures from real GDP, a measure of private performance is derived 
that does not vary directly with changes in government expenditures. 
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from Jacob Madsen (2007 and 2013). More specific descriptions of the variables used and their sources 
are provided in a data appendix.  The appendix also includes a table describing the statistical 
characteristics of the data with particular emphasis on their time series properties. 
The difficulty with doing time series analysis on annual data is that long time periods are required to 
generate a sufficient number of observations so that econometric techniques can filter out randomness 
and reveal longer term trends. The use of a long time period, however, poses problems of its own since 
a long time series does not necessarily mean that each drawing comes from the same distribution.  In 
this respect New Zealand is one of a small number of countries whose fundamental political, legal and 
economic institutions have remained sufficiently unchanged to justify an assumption of stability.11 On 
the other hand, the small size and export orientation of the New Zealand economy makes it more 
susceptible to external shocks.  In New Zealand’s case two great twentieth century shocks —the Great 
Depression and WW2—can easily be seen in the raw data.  For this reason these exogenous shocks are 
included as potential breaks in the endogenous cointegration relationships.  Finally, another difficulty 
with long run data is that it is rare to find consistent detail on the composition of many aggregates.  In 
New Zealand, for example, information on the composition of government expenditures is difficult to 
find before the 1980’s and when it is available—such as for government transfers from 1876 onward—
there is often a significant break in its coverage (1939-51).  It is a second reason why the test was 
structured in terms of aggregate government expenditure.  
With this background I present in Table 1 the results of the hypothesis tests outlined in equations (3) 
and (4).   Before discussing the individual results, however, I note that despite the high R2’s and low 
Durbin Watson statistics being the potential sign of a spurious relationship among this set of I(1) 
variables, the residuals of these equations are all found to be stationary, as the adjusted Dickey Fuller 
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 In addition, New Zealand has no provincial or state sub-national governments that complicate the analysis of 
government size in countries with comparable political and legal systems (such as Australia, Canada, India and the 
United States). 
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statistics indicate.  This means that the estimated linear relationships among the set of variables, all of 
which are trending upwards, are consistent with cointegration and thus consistent with the hypothesis 
that the estimated equation describes a long run equilibrium relationship among these variables.       
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 the OLS estimates of equations (3) and (4) are presented.  While 
both estimates provide results that are consistent with cointegration, equation (2) suggests that the 
insignificant effect of LNGSIZE found in column (1) may arise from the nonlinear effect that government 
size has on output.  Unfortunately, while the coefficient estimates of the OLS equation may be super 
consistent, the standard errors that suggest the nonlinear effect are typically biased upwards by the 
presence of correlations among the explanatory variables across time.  Hence in equations (3) and (4) I 
present the FMOLS and DOLS estimates to correct for this bias.  Doing so confirms the expected positive 
productivity of physical and human capital on private output while providing evidence consistent with 
the inverted U-shaped effect of government size on private output illustrated in Figure 2.  The results 
permit rejection of the hypothesis that government size has no interrelationship with private output per 
capita and are broadly supportive of the government size is nonlinear with an inverted U-shaped in its 
effect on private output.12  Finally while the specific coefficient estimates for LNGSIZE and LNGSIZE_SQ 
vary somewhat across columns (2)-(4), the ratios of the coefficients that determine the tipping point are 
remarkably consistent across the three equations. Together they imply a government size, somewhere 
between twenty five and thirty percent of GDP, would be consistent with maximizing the effect of 
government size on private output. 
4. Short Run variation about the Long Run and Convergence 
A long run equilibrium, such as that implied by the cointegrating equations of Table 1 column (2) 
through (4), is economically meaningful only if it is stable and this implies that transitory departures 
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  While the coefficient estimates all have their expected sign and the FMOLS estimates are significant at the five 
percent level, the DOLS estimates are significantly different from zero at only the ten percent level.  
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from the equilibrium path must be reversed through time.  This implies that any short run model of the 
effect of government size on per capita output should account for changes in government size that form 
part of the process of adjustment back to the longer run equilibrium. Hence to account for the presence 
of a short run transition process back to long run equilibrium, I present the second stage Engel Granger 
error correction model.  Here the focus on how changes in the growth rate of government size affect the 
growth rate of per capital income creates a way in which I can compare the results of this approach with 
the existing literature on government size in New Zealand.      
   ---insert Table 2 about here ---- 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 I present two versions of the second stage Engle-Granger error 
correction model.  In both cases the significantly negative sign on the error correction term reinforces 
the earlier finding of cointegration in that random departures from the estimated long run cointegration 
path are reversed through appropriate changes in the covariates through time.  The size of the error 
correction terms, however, indicates that the process of adjustment to the long run is relatively long 
which helps to explain the persistent in the residuals of the long run.  The results also suggest that it is 
changes in the physical stock of capital and changes in the size of central government debt that are 
relatively more important explaining changes in private output than are changes in the level of 
educational attainment.  The different versions of short run adjustment represented by columns (1) and 
(2) allow a closer focus on the way that changes in the expenditure size of government affects output in 
the short as opposed to the long run.  That is, column (1) shows little evidence of the inverted U-shaped 
effect of government size on output witnessed in the long run. Column (2), on the other hand, indicates 
that there is a significant negative relationship arising linearly between short run changes in government 
size and changes in private output.  Taken literally this suggests that fiscal policy (short run change in 
government expenditure) has been perverse in its effect on private output.  However the inability to tie 
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causality directly to correlation allows for the possibility that the negative relationship reflects the 
countercyclical role played by fiscal policy over the business cycle. That is, the negative relationship 
could be capturing the positive (negative) response of government expenditure to unexpected 
decreases (increases) in the growth rate of private per capita output.  I return shortly to examine this 
possibility more closely in the context of a vector error correction model. 
 There is a relatively long empirical literature on the effect of government size in New Zealand, but a 
concern with the implications of the time series dimensions of that debate has been relatively recent.13  
As is true of the literature more generally, the key question of policy interest has been the relationship 
between the level of government size and the rate of economic growth.14 In an early paper that covered 
the relatively short 1960-1980 time period, Bairam (1988) modified Ram’s (1986) empirical method of 
regressing the growth rate of government size on the growth rate of real output to regress the annual 
growth rate of government size in New Zealand on the growth rates of consumption and private 
investment (all I(0)).  But while the statistical relationship found between these two stationary growth 
rates is not spurious, it is also not clear that the regression coefficient can measure the long run effect of 
government size on consumption and private investment.  Because all of these growth rates are 
stationary, there can be no permanent effect on either growth rate from a permanent increase 
(decrease) in the growth rate of government expenditures.  Rather the results tell us that transitory 
changes in the rates about a constant mean are correlated.  Nevertheless the finding of no government 
size effect on consumption growth and a significant positive effect on investment growth reinforced 
ideas present in the broader literature that growth was the relevant performance measure affected by 
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 For an alternative analysis linking of the levels of government size with the level of output see Kumar, Webber 
and Fargher (2012) who focus on cointegration in relation to a test of Wagner’s Law. 
14
 The consensus view of this large literature, surveyed recently by Bergh and Henrekson (2011) and Facchini and 
Melki (2013), is that government size while typically ambiguous in its effect is more often found to have a negative 
rather than positive effect on growth.  
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government size and that it was the composition rather than the level of government size that would 
matter.  
In a complementary empirical paper, Grimes (2003) challenged the empirical findings of Gwartney, 
Holcombe and Lawson (1998) who had found a strongly negative effect of government size on decade 
average growth rates for a panel of twenty three OECD countries (including New Zealand) between 1960 
and 1996. In reproducing that work for New Zealand to correct for what Grimes argued were model 
misspecifications (i.e., using income rather than income per capita, leaving out convergence 
considerations and not using a number of country specific dummies), Grimes found that government 
size now had a much smaller (i.e., insignificantly negative) effect on the growth rate of per capita 
income.15 This finding was seen as broadly in line with other disaggregated studies and again taken to 
suggest that “the structure of the government budget has much more impact on growth outcomes than 
the size of the budget” (Grimes p. 172, emphasis in original). 
At the opposite extreme, however, lies the work of Scully (1989, 1996 and 2000). Using a production 
function relationship and a nonlinear specification, Scully attributed the lower growth rates experienced 
by New Zealand following WW2 to high levels of taxation. His empirical work suggested the growth 
maximizing size of government for New Zealand was about twenty percent of GDP and that would be 
achieved if the optimal tax rate were cut to roughly half its then current size (i.e., from roughly 40 to 20 
per cent).   
In their most recent review of the literature on government size in New Zealand, the New Zealand 
Treasury [Cook, Schousboe and Law (2011, p. 1)] took a more moderate approach by concluding that 
“theory and evidence suggest that high levels of government expenditure, as a percentage of the 
economy, can be detrimental to economic growth due to the economic costs of raising taxation to 
                                                          
15
 See Grimes (2003, p.161, Table 3 columns 2, 2a, 3, and 4). It is not clear how Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson 
who originate the form used by Grimes interpret the presence of the change in G/Y appearing columns 1 and 1a 
(other than it is smaller and less significant than the coefficient on G/Y).  
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finance expenditure…However, both theory and empirical research emphasize that we cannot divorce 
the economic growth impact of the level of expenditure from the mix of expenditure and revenue”.  
Rather than simply reducing size, they argue, the better route is to restrain non-growth promoting 
expenditures while reducing growth-distorting taxation.16 
In Columns (3) through (5) of Table 2 I illustrate the time series problems these papers raise by 
estimating directly the relationship between government size and economic growth for New Zealand in 
the context of a simple growth model that utilizes the current set of explanatory variables.  Column (3) 
presents the regression result when the growing level of government size is used (together with changes 
in the capital stock and level of educational attainment) to explain New Zealand’s stationary growth 
rate.  As the different orders of integration suggest, no significant relationship can be found between 
the size level and the growth rate.  Column (4), on the other hand, replaces the level of government size 
with the growth rate of that size.  In essence it replicates column (2) but without the error correction 
term.17 Here a significantly negative relationship is again found (as in column (2)) but not between 
government size and growth.  Rather the correlation links variations in the non-trending growth rate 
with variations in the growth rate of government size.  The significant negative relationship then means 
only that contemporaneous deviations in the growth path of government size are associated with 
transitory rather than permanent changes in the rate of economic growth.18   As was the case with 
column (2), whether this implies short run fiscal policy is perverse or a reflection of the countercyclical 
response of fiscal policy to the business cycle remains to be seen.   
                                                          
16
 While not directed specifically at the issue of government size and economic performance, New Zealand has a 
flourishing literature examining the size of the multiplier effects produced by fiscal policy that uses VARs. This 
intersects with this paper in terms of short run fiscal variations about longer run trends but differs in its exclusive 
concern with the consequences of “pure” fiscal shocks.  The concern here is with both long and short run reasons 
for expenditure and debt changes and their effects on economic performance, whether the fiscal response is built 
to respond automatically to the business cycle or is the result of explicit and discretionary policy choice.  For 
examples of VAR multiplier analysis, see Claus et. al. (2006) and Parkyn and Vehbi (2013).  
17
 Note that the lower adjusted R
2
 (4) in comparison with (2) reflects the additional explanatory power given to the 
equation by use of the error correction term. 
18
 This interpretation remains no matter what alternative detrending procedure is used to induce stationarity. 
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Before turning to this question I include, for completeness, column (5) that includes the effect of 
adding a squared term in the growth rate of government size to the equation. This formally tests the 
hypothesis that with the appropriate time series adjustment to the size variable, it is the growth rate in 
government size that will produce the expected (inverted U-shaped) effect on growth.  The result rejects 
this hypothesis, confirming the superiority of the linear effect found in columns (2) and (4) and thus the 
suggestion that short run effect of changes in government size on the rate of growth is qualitatively 
different from long term or permanent change in that size.  That is, the short run interrelationship 
appears as both negative and linear while the long run remains positive overall but exhibits diminishing 
returns.  
5. Joint estimation and Impulse Responses  
        One weakness with the method used to illustrate the long and short run relationships arising among 
government size and economic performance is that each step has been estimated in isolation.  In 
practice, however, the long and short run fiscal dimensions of fiscal policy are chosen simultaneously 
and their effects become comingled in the same aggregate data.  Because our interest is in how the 
multiple effects of fiscal policy affect output, this suggests that the two steps should be estimated jointly 
so that estimation can capture the long run considerations in determining government size and output 
interacting with the shorter run objectives of countercyclical policy. There is also the complication that 
short run changes in output per capita can affect changes in government size at the same time that 
changes in size affect output per capita.19  Hence to account for the presence in the short run of 
transition process back to long run equilibrium and to explore the possibility of two way causation 
among the key variables, I estimate a vector error correction model. 
                                                          
19
 A Granger causality test (two lags) allows us to reject the hypotheses that LNPYPC does not Granger cause 
LNGSIZE (p = 0.0045) and that LNGSIZE does not cause LNRPRIVYPC (p = 0.0184). 
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In economic terms, the vector error correction model (VECM) does two important things.  First it 
estimates the long run cointegrating relationship as part of its estimation of the shorter run adjustment 
process.  By incorporating error correction terms the estimation procedure can distinguish among the 
potentially different objectives of fiscal policy in the short run—separate counter-cyclical variations in 
expenditure to smooth the business cycle while accounting for the adjustment process back to long run 
equilibrium—as well as distinguish the short run from the longer run interaction between government 
size and private per capita output implicit in the cointegrating equation.  By estimating both dimensions 
simultaneously, the short and long run models interact to each other and hence can provide a superior 
estimate of the processes than can separate estimation through the 2-step Engle-Granger procedure.  
The second important benefit of the VECM is that the structure provides a method for disentangling 
opposing causal effects.  That is, the technique provides one way of distinguishing the short run effect of 
government size on per capita output from the effect of short run changes in per capita output on 
government size.  Moreover, the method allows these effects to be represented conveniently and 
diagrammatically in terms of impulse response functions.  
The VECM associated with the long run model of Table 1 column (2) is presented as Table 3 
where the existence of cointegration is indicated by the sign and significance of the error correction 
terms.  Note that the scaling of the level variables and the order they appear in the cointegrating 
equation imply different signs for error correction terms when indicating convergence.  Hence the error 
correction coefficients in the D(LNPYPC) and D(LNGSIZE) short run equations both indicate that realized 
transitory departures from the long run equilibrium path will be reversed through the appropriate 
response of per capita output and government size. The error correction coefficient in output equation 
is significantly negative as required (indicating the fall in private per capita output back towards the 
equilibrium path) while the error correction coefficients on the government size variables are 
significantly positive indicating a closing of that gap through an increase in size.  The insignificance of 
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error correction terms in the capital stock and educational attainment equations does mean that while 
these variables may be important determinants of the long run, they do not play a strong role in the re-
adjustment process to the long run. The size of the two government size coefficients indicates the 
relative importance of changes in government size in restoring the long run relationship.   
-- insert Table 3 about here -- 
      In terms of the cointegrating equation itself, the equation estimates confirm the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between government size and private per capita output estimated earlier for the long run.  
The two government coefficient estimates have their predicted sign and are significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent level.  Together they imply a tipping point for the effect of government size on 
private output of 33.2 per cent of GDP, somewhat larger than our earlier estimates.  Similarly the effect 
of an increase in the ratio of central government debt (to GDP) is found to have a significantly negative 
effect on private output per capita.  These two results then confirm the hypothesis tests undertaken 
earlier for the effect of government size on private per capita output in the long run. On the other hand, 
neither the level of the capital stock nor the level educational attainment is found to exhibit the 
significant positive effect on output found earlier.  This is despite the contemporaneous coefficients of 
change in both variables being positive and the sum of the short run coefficients for the capital stock 
seeming to indicate a more positive correlation over the long run. 
The short run adjustment process appears in the six error correction equations found in the 
bottom half of the table.  Because the VAR structure allows for each variable to affect and to be affected 
by every other variable, the coefficient estimates embody a complicated mixture of simultaneous 
contemporary effects.  Hence to disentangle the different contemporaneous indicators, assumptions 
must be made about which contemporaneous effect is not present and/or what long run coefficient 
restrictions should be applied. The ordering of our variables in the Cholesky decomposition implies that 
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while government size can respond contemporaneously to changes in per capita income, per capita 
income can respond only with a lag to changes in government size.20  The impulse responses of a one 
standard deviation shock to government size and per capita income can then be determined from the 
coefficient estimates.  The impulse response functions of interest are illustrated in Figure 3.   
-- insert Figure 3 about here -- 
In the top left hand diagram in Figure 3, the short run response of private output to a one 
standard deviation shock to government size is shown.  Here the shock to government expenditure can 
be seen as leading private output to rise slowly and persistently through time.  On the other hand, in the 
top right hand diagram, an unexpected shock to private output is shown to produce a sharply negative 
rather than positive response, with the size of that response falling off rapidly.  The contemporaneous 
response of government expenditure to an unexpected change in income is then consistent with 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy, as the government responds in a classically Keynesian manner to the 
business cycle.  The two short run relationships indicated by the VECM then help to explain the 
seemingly opposing relationships found in the overall positive effect of government size appearing in 
Table 1 with the strongly negative linear effect captured in columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.  The two 
opposing causal effects also make more understandable why countercyclical fiscal intervention would 
be undertaken if the negative short run effect found in Table 2 had meant only that greater government 
spending reduced rather than increased real output. 
 A similar indication of counter-cyclical intervention in the short run is indicated by the impulse 
response of central government debt to a real income shock shown in the second diagram of the second 
row of Figure 3.  While the left hand diagram represents the expected negative effect of rising debt on 
                                                          
20
 As is true of most VARs a reordering of the variables does change somewhat the pattern described by the 
impulse response function.  Hence while it may be reasonable to assume a lag to fiscal response, the results 
portrayed are conditional on that assumption.   
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per capita income found throughout this analysis, the second diagram shows that government debt 
responds immediately and in the opposite direction to a real income shock.  Because a government 
deficit increases the debt to GDP ratio, a spending response resulting in a deficit to an unexpected fall in 
per capita income would imply the negative relationship implied in that diagram. 
Finally in the bottom row of Figure 3 the impulse responses linking government size and the 
government debt ratio through time are presented.  The first diagram shows that while there is no   
immediate increase in government debt to an increase in government size, government debt does tend 
to rise with an increase in government size.  In the second, government size increases with a shock to 
government debt.  Hence while there is no necessary reason why government size and government debt 
ratios should be related positively through time, they have tended to be so related in New Zealand’s 
case. 
6. Economic Significance and Policy Implications 
 While the discussion explaining the theoretical model and the interpretation of the empirical 
results is written in terms of the growth in government size that has occurred over the past century in 
New Zealand, the 1994 passage of Fiscal Responsibility Act in New Zealand brought about or coincided 
with a dramatic reversal of this trend.  By the period leading immediately into the 2007/8 financial crisis, 
central government size had fallen from over forty percent of GDP in 1993 to roughly thirty percent (a 
fall of twenty five percent) by 2007.  Similarly, central government debt was also reduced significantly, 
falling from over sixty percent of GDP in 1993 to roughly twenty percent by 2008.  In the period since, 
both ratios have risen somewhat, due at least in part to counter-cyclical measures and deficits adopted 
to shelter the New Zealand economy from this external shock.  However, even with this later rebound, 
the improvement in the central government’s overall fiscal position has been quite remarkable.  
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 It follows from this analysis that the reduction in government size from a level well in excess of 
any of the tipping points estimated in Tables 1 or 3 and the even more substantive reduction in central 
government debt should have increased private output per capita above what it would otherwise have 
been.  There should have been an output level premium. Hence to test for its presence and to provide a 
quantitative measure of the magnitude of this effect I simulated the FMOLS model estimated as column 
(3) in Table 1 over the post 1994 time period under the assumption that government size, government 
size squared and the central government debt ratio had stayed constant at the 1994 values.   Intuitively, 
this produces a measure of how the economy would have performed in the long run after allowing 
physical and human capital to accumulate unaltered but holding the fiscal dimensions of government 
constant.  These results are shown in Figure 4. 
    ---  insert Figure 4 around here – 
Figure 4 plots three time series.  The solid line plots the actual values of the logarithm of private 
income per capita, LNPYPC, over the 1890 – 2011 time period.  The dashed line plots the expected 
values that arise from error correction equation of Table 1 column (2), labelled as LNPYPC_Forecasted 
between 1890 and 2011.  The third dotted line is the same as LNPYPC_Forecasted through 1994, 
however, from 1995 through 2011, LNPYPC94 plots the model’s estimate of what LNPYPC would have 
been had government size and the central government debt ratio been held constant at their 1994 
values.  The visual result—the slowly increasing dotted line--illustrates the simulation’s prediction that 
as both physical and human capital continued to grow in the post 1994 period, private output per capital 
would have continued to rise even with no change in government size or the government debt ratio.  
Nevertheless the faster rise in LNPYPC_Forecasted (and actual) indicates that the rise in per capita 
output would have been much faster with the realized decline in both ratios.   
The gap between the actual and predicted values of LNPYPC and the dotted line simulating the 
predicted outcome holding government size and the debt ratio constant is then one measure of the 
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output premium realized by lowering these values.  The diagram shows that that gap continued to rise 
for some time, capturing the increased premium realized by the continuing fall in size and debt ratios.  
While the growing output gap on the diagram appears large relative to the residuals that arise between 
actual and predicted LNPYPC, the logarithmic scaling of the diagram tends to understate the magnitude 
of the output premium and its relative significance.  For example, in 2011 the output premium or dollar 
measure of the gap (in NZ 2000 dollars) was roughly $2,285 per capita.  This means that New Zealanders 
in 2011 would have received an income that was on average 11 percent lower than their then current 
per capita income of $20,885.57 (had contraction not taken place).  The rise in government size and 
government debt that has recently taken place in response to the recent recession means that this 
comparison understates the aggregate progress that had been made.  For example, in the period 
immediately before the financial crisis took hold in 2008, the output premium peaked at $4,500 per 
capita or roughly 20 percent of the $23,000 per capita received in 2008.  Finally, because the current 
(i.e., 2012) size of the New Zealand central government (33.0%) is close to our estimates of the tipping 
point (25-30%) and likely to be temporarily large because of its position in the current business cycle, 
further per capita output gains from reducing long run government size seem unlikely. 
Simulation results such as these remain subject to the well-known Lucas critique.  All other 
dimensions of the analysis will not remain constant when the policy parameters change (or do not 
change as is the current case).  This means that the large savings generated by this analysis should not 
be taken literally for policy purposes.  What should be taken seriously, however, is that size and 
significance of the coefficient estimates mean that the output premium realized in New Zealand’s case 
has not been trivial.  In this sense it is a useful method to consider for countries considering a similar 
restructuring.  In addition, New Zealand’s period of deliberate retrenchment seems to have served them 
in the short run.  That is, by entering the current recession with a substantially reduced the level and 
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burden to its debt, New Zealand found itself with much greater financial flexibility in its ability to 
respond to the crisis. 
  
 7. Conclusion 
For all countries the relationship between private economic performance and government size 
is complex and multidimensional, involving a number of different short and long run effects that 
become bundled together in single fiscal and output time series.  My purpose in this paper was to 
unbundle a number of these dimensions in the case of New Zealand.  To do so the analysis began with 
an Engle-Granger cointegration and error correction approach and then supplemented that with a 
vector error correction model that provided one way of examining causality in the short run.  
  Application of this approach to New Zealand suggests that government size and private output 
per capita have an inverted U-shaped relationship in the long run that implies the existence of 
diminishing returns in the provision of government services as government size has grown over time.  
The coefficient estimates of the empirical work suggest that the positive effect of government size on 
private performance peaks at around thirty percent of GDP (very close to its current size).  The empirical 
work also suggests that there is a long run burden to servicing government debt.  The latter need not 
imply that any accumulation of any government debt is counterproductive, but should focus attention 
on the reason for its accumulation.   
The short run relationships are more complex but just as insightful.  First, a significant part of 
the short run movement in these variables is attributable to the relatively slow convergence of 
government size and income per capita on their long run cointegrating/equilibrium time path in 
response to both transitory and permanent shocks.  Second, accounting for the error correction process 
allows a sharper focus on the shorter run aspects of fiscal policy with short run changes in government 
size found to be inversely related to transitory changes in per capita output.  The VECM provided one 
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way of examining the two way causality arising between economic performance and government size.  
The impulse responses reveal time paths consistent with a fiscal policy response to the business cycle 
that is both transitory and counter-cyclical in nature.  At the same time, however, short run changes in 
government spending are associated increases in per capita output. The pattern of findings then 
suggests that while causality can run in both directions, outcomes in the very short run are consistent 
with government spending responding to the cycle and over the longer short run with causality running 
from government size to per capita income.  
The New Zealand case has particular interest because of the explicit efforts made in the recent 
past to reduce the outstanding ratio of government debt and to control or contract the growth rate of 
government size.  To a large extent this effort has been successful.  The simulation results of this paper 
suggest that while the political and economic costs of cutting back may have been difficult, the effort did 
pay off in terms of increasing per capita private output.  Moreover, while the long run results suggest 
that there is little more to be gained, and perhaps something to lose, from further contraction, the 
magnitude of the gain arising from this contraction does appear to have been quite large, perhaps 
sufficient enough to have offset other dimensions of welfare foregone in the contraction (but arising 
outside the framework of this analysis).  Finally, the analysis suggests that the traditional countercyclical 
role for fiscal policy has been used and has been effective.  At the same time the analysis warns of the 
long run cost of any asymmetry in its implementation spilling over into larger government size and/or 
higher levels of government debt.  
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Source:  Statistics New Zealand and the New Zealand Treasury (see Appendix for Details) 
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Table 1 
The Effect of Government Size on Private Output per capita 
New Zealand:  1870 - 2011 
(absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 
Dependent Variable (1) 
LNPYPC 
OLS 
(2) 
LNPYPC 
OLS 
(3) 
LNPYPC 
FMOLS1 
(4) 
LNPYPC 
DOLS1 
LNKPC 0.321 
(3.74) 
0.372 
(4.30) 
0.233 
(1.60) 
0.293** 
(2.41) 
LNED_ATTAINMENT 0.487 
(6.33) 
0.391 
(4.59) 
0.448*** 
(3.01) 
0.673*** 
(3.14) 
LNGSIZE 0.013 
(0.350) 
0.937 
(2.43) 
1.44** 
(2.26) 
1.26* 
(1.74) 
LNGSIZE_SQ 
 
-0.145 
(2.41) 
-0.213** 
(2.14) 
-0.189* 
(1.73) 
LNCGDEBT -0.275 
(8.58) 
-0.266 
(8.41) 
-0.306*** 
(5.89) 
-0.222*** 
(3.36) 
DEPRESSION -0.120 
(3.75) 
-0.130 
(4.11) 
-0.105** 
(2.03) 
-0.131*** 
(2.75) 
WW2 0.246 
(7.94) 
0.249 
(8.18) 
0.294*** 
(5.93) 
0.247*** 
(4.23) 
Constant 10.45 
(26.13) 
9.36 
(15.61) 
8.02*** 
(8.19) 
7.59*** 
(9.27) 
Statistics 
no. of obs 
Adj.R2 
DW 
ADF2 
Estimated Tipping 
point    (G/Y)* 
 
122 
.975 
0.604 
-4.76** 
 
 
 
122 
.976 
0.709 
-5.18*** 
 
25.3% 
 
121 
.973 
0.752 
-5.25*** 
 
29.4% 
 
119 
 
 
-4.94** 
 
28.0% 
*** (**)[*]  significantly different from zero at 1% (5%) [10%]. 
1
 FMOLS and DOLS use Bartlett kernel and Newey-West fixed bandwidth = 5.0 to estimate long run covariance with 
a maximum of three lags and one fixed lead and lag for the DOLS. The leads and lagged differences of the 
independent variables are omitted from the table and WW2, DEPRESSION and LNCGDEBT treated as cointegrating 
equation deterministics.  
2 
MacKinnon (1996) 5% critical value for 5 variables (-4.17) and 6 variables (-4.51); 1% critical value for 6 (-5.11). 
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Table 2 
Engle-Granger Error Correction and Growth models for New Zealand 1890 – 2011 
(absolute value of t-statistic in brackets) 
 
 (1) 
D(LNPYPC) 
(2) 
D(LNPYPC) 
(3) 
D(LNPYPC) 
(4) 
D(LNPYPC) 
(5) 
D(LNPYPC) 
Error Correction Term1 -0.204*** 
(4.80) 
-0.200** 
(4.71) 
   
D(LNK_PC) 0.569*** 
(3.08) 
0.562 
(2.99) 
0.748*** 
(2.62) 
0.570*** 
(2.84) 
0.572*** 
(2.84) 
D(LNED_ATTAINMENT) .172 
(0.61) 
0.174 
(0.60) 
-0.183 
(0.28) 
0.081 
(0.792) 
0.078 
(0.25) 
LNGSIZE 
 
  
-0.014 
(0.97) 
  
D(LNGSIZE) -0.035 
(0.11) 
-0.316*** 
(9.95) 
 
-0.360*** 
(11.06) 
-.265 
(0.76) 
D(LNGSIZE_SQ) -0.047 
(0.87) 
   
-0.016 
(0.28) 
D(LNCGDEBT) -0.287*** 
(8.59) 
-0.287*** 
(8.53) 
-0.372*** 
(7.66) 
-0.256*** 
(7.21) 
-0.255*** 
(7.15) 
WW2 0.030** 
(2.56) 
0.030** 
(2.47) 
0.041** 
(2.08) 
0.027** 
(2.08) 
0.027** 
(2.08) 
Constant -0.0004 
(0.10) 
-0.0004 
(0.09) 
0.042 
(0.82) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
0.002 
(0.43) 
Statistics 
No. of Obs. 
Adj. R2 
 
121 
0.741 
 
121 
0.753 
 
121 
0.426 
 
121 
0.707 
 
121 
0.705 
*** (**)[*]  significantly different from zero at 1% (5%) [10%]. 
1
  Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) 1% (5%) critical value for 6 variables -4.80 (-4.19) 
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Table 3 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
New Zealand:  1893 2011 after adjustments 
(absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
       
       Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1      
       
       LNPYPC(-1)  1.000000      
       
LNK_PC(-1) -0.122408      
 [0.54327]      
       
LNED_ATTAINMENT(-1)  0.390985      
 [ 0.92044]      
       
LNGSIZE(-1) -4.242838***      
 [4.11921]      
       
LNGSIZE_SQ(-1)  0.609272***      
 [3.89981]      
       
LNCGDEBT(-1)  0.381359***      
 [4.13172]      
       
C -5.060541      
       
       
Error Correction: D(LNPYPC) D(LNK_PC) 
D(LNED_ATTAI
NMENT) D(LNGSIZE) D(LNGSIZE_SQ) D(LNCGDEBT) 
       
       CointEq1
t 
-0.229507** -0.009987  3.54E-05  0.391212**  2.217715**  0.031930 
 [4.75798] [0.89989] [0.02110] [4.77018] [4.40176] [ 0.43940] 
       
D(LNPYPC(-1)) -0.012519 -0.002212  0.003765  0.230602  1.430840 -0.176994 
 [0.08101] [0.06222] [ 0.70062] [ 0.87771] [ 0.88650] [0.76030] 
       
D(LNPYPC(-2)) -0.272149* -0.021989  8.70E-05  0.062700  0.212371  0.878369 
 [1.76365] [0.61934] [ 0.01622] [ 0.23898] [ 0.13176] [ 3.77846] 
       
D(LNK_PC(-1))  1.912027***  0.648812*** -0.031631** -2.788998*** -16.56392*** -1.663539** 
 [ 4.37152] [ 6.44729] [2.07988] [3.75044] [3.62573] [2.52466] 
       
D(LNK_PC(-2)) -0.753489*  0.002613  0.014432  1.295163*  7.706678*  1.256143* 
 [1.70272] [ 0.02566] [ 0.93795] [ 1.72141] [ 1.66735] [ 1.88424] 
       
D(LNED_ATTAINMENT(-1))  2.948468  0.981688  0.440796*** -1.728955 -15.69019 -13.16326*** 
 [ 1.10264] [ 1.59563] [ 4.74089] [0.38029] [0.56177] [3.26763] 
       
D(LNED_ATTAINMENT(-2)) -6.203705** -1.017572*  0.471628***  7.271599  46.51596*  13.11279*** 
 [2.36176] [1.68372] [5.16378] [1.62821] [1.69543] [ 3.31368] 
       
D(LNGSIZE(-1))  0.328232  0.201982  0.012146 -0.009125 -0.530916 -1.877278** 
 [ 0.59482] [ 1.59089] [ 0.63300] [0.00973] [0.09211] [2.25822] 
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D(LNGSIZE(-2)) -0.006941 -0.086260  0.025097 -0.359287 -1.385702 -0.738125 
 [0.01209] [0.65312] [ 1.25740] [0.36813] [0.23111] [0.85354] 
       
D(LNGSIZE_SQ(-1)) -0.065688 -0.035035* -0.001798  0.029866  0.256612  0.300771** 
 [0.71906] [1.66690] [0.56596] [ 0.19229] [ 0.26894] [ 2.18549] 
       
D(LNGSIZE_SQ(-2)) -0.013091  0.014397 -0.004120  0.062159  0.231540  0.178888 
 [0.13778] [ 0.65857] [1.24716] [ 0.38479] [ 0.23332] [ 1.24979] 
       
D(LNCGDEBT(-1)) -0.062282 -0.012784  0.004031  0.003070  0.041373  0.354404*** 
 [0.75653] [0.67495] [ 1.40824] [ 0.02193] [ 0.04811] [ 2.85756] 
       
D(LNCGDEBT(-2))  0.069998 -0.017079 -0.001494 -0.064882 -0.392590  0.185053 
 [ 0.91945] [0.97508] [0.56444] [0.50127] [0.49372] [ 1.61352] 
       
C  0.032527***  0.005634**  0.000645 -0.031100 -0.161520 -0.012764 
 [ 2.82870] [ 2.12945] [ 1.61444] [1.59077] [1.34483] [0.73684] 
       
WW2  0.091099*** -0.000475  8.85E-05 -0.138145*** -0.788119*** -0.012577 
 [ 3.81751] [0.08659] [ 0.10665] [3.40482] [3.16192] [0.34984] 
       
DEPRESSION -0.043223** -0.004998 -0.000602  0.056238  0.303218  0.028855 
 [1.97323] [0.99163] [0.79104] [ 1.51003] [ 1.32529] [ 0.87441] 
       
        R-squared  0.384783  0.486797  0.965589  0.324495  0.296993  0.390847 
 Adj. R-squared  0.295188  0.412059  0.960577  0.226120  0.194614  0.302135 
 Sum sq. resids  0.224512  0.011885  0.000271  0.649005  24.49353  0.509539 
 S.E. equation  0.046688  0.010742  0.001623  0.079379  0.487649  0.070335 
 F-statistic  4.294700  6.513362  192.6798  3.298566  2.900903  4.405818 
 Log likelihood  204.3869  379.2366  604.1047  141.2269 -74.80118  155.6219 
 Akaike AIC -3.166166 -6.104817 -9.884112 -2.104653  1.526070 -2.346587 
 Schwarz SC -2.792502 -5.731154 -9.510448 -1.730990  1.899734 -1.972923 
 Mean dependent  0.011318  0.013174  0.009592  0.007779  0.047979 -0.009221 
 S.D. dependent  0.055611  0.014009  0.008176  0.090234  0.543382  0.084195 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.25E-20     
 Determinant resid covariance  5.27E-21     
 Log likelihood  1765.021     
 Akaike information criterion -27.94993     
 Schwarz criterion -25.56783     
       
       ***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1% (5%)[10%]. Lag length determined by minimization of the Akaike 
Criterion. 
 t
 Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) 1% (5%)  critical values: 6 variables -4.80  (-4.19) 
Lag length determined by a Chi-squared lag exclusion test. 
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Figure 3 
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Sources:  Statistics New Zealand and the forecasted values of the OLS equation in Table 1 column (2).  LNYPPC94 
uses the coefficient estimates of the cointegration equation in Table 1 column (2) and actual covariate values for 
each year except for the period following 1994 when government size, government size squared and the central 
government debt ratio are held constant at their 1994 values. 
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Figure 4   
The Logarithmic values of Private output per capita in NewZealand: 
actual, predicted and simulated post 1994 
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Appendix on New Zealand data sources:  1890 – 2012 
A.  Data 1890 – 2002, downloaded from the web site below (on October 20 2011):   
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/economic_indicators/NationalAccounts/long-term-
data-series.aspx     (terminated in 2002). 
RGDP = Real Gross Domestic Product (Table e1-2 column AH in 2000$)   
RGDPPC = Real Gross Domestic Product per capita (Table e1-2, column AK in 2000$) 
D(.) = first difference operator ; LN(.) = log(variable) 
D(LNRGDPPC) = growth rate of real GDP per capita 
RCGDebt = consolidated real central government debt (Table d4-1 column AJ in 2000$) 
LNCGDEBT = LN(RCGDebt/RGDP) 
RCGE = Real Central government expenditure (Table d2-1 column AP in 2000$) 
LNGSIZE = LN[(RCGE/RGDP)*100];  LNGSIZE_SQ = LNGSIZE*LNGSIZE 
PYPC = Real private sector output per capita  (2000$) = (RGDP-RCGE)/Pop 
LNPYPC= LN(RYPC) 
D(LNPYPC) = Growth_pypc = growth rate of private income per capita 
CGREV = Central government revenues (Table d1-1, 1867 -2002 breakdown sheet, Column U) 
RCGREV = Real Central Government Revenues/CPI_2000 (Table d1-1 data sheet column U 2000 = 100) 
 
B. Updating from 2002-2011/2: 
 
1. Statistics New Zealand Infoshare: Long Term Data Series 2001-2012, 
www.stats.govt.nz/infoshare/long-term_data_series, downloaded February 20 2013 
RGDP (1995/6) = GDP nominal in constant 1995/6 dollars 
POP = Population estimates in NZ – DPEA 
RGDPPC (1995/96) = RGDP(1995/6)/POP converted to 2000 $ at 2002 (adjustment factor = 1.01592309). 
Terms_of Trade: Table 1.02 Overseas merchandise trade price and terms of trade index, series STTZZ5  
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/industry_sectors/imports_and_exports/OverseasTradeInde
xesPrices_HOTPSep12qtr.aspx, downloaded February 25 2013. 
2. New Zealand Treasury: www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/forecasts/befu2010/befu10-pt5of6.pdf  
Government Revenue and Expenses as a ratio of GDP:  Times Series of Fiscal Indicators p.159. 
(downloaded Feb 25 2013). 
CGDebt_ratio =  Gross Central Government Debt incl. RB settlement cash and bank bills/GDP nominal. 
Time Series of Fiscal and Economic Indicators, 2012 Half-year economic and fiscal update, B.6 p.126 
online source at http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/forecasts/hyefu2012/hyefu12-pt10of11.pdf 
(downloaded Feb 26 2013). 
 
C.   Educational Attainment and Capital Stock Data 1890 – 2011 (Jakob Madsen data) 
32 
 
 
Madsen, J.B., (2013) “Human Capital and the World Technology Frontier.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics, forthcoming. (for educational attainment) 
 
Madsen, J.B., (2007) “Technology Spillover through Trade and TFP convergence: 135 Years of Evidence 
for the OECD countries.” Journal of International Economics, 72(2), 464-480. (for real capital 
stock). 
  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used (1890 -2012) 
 Mean Max Min Std 
Dev 
ADF 
Ho Series has a unit root  
KPSS 
Ho  Series is stationary 
LNPYPC 
D(LNPYPC) 
9.27 
1.10 
10.04 
15.9 
8.56 
-13.5 
0.41 
5.52 
-0.773       intercept 
-9.99***   intercept  
1.28*** 
0.036*      
LNGSIZE 
D(LNGSIZE) 
3.06 3.73 2.48 0.39 -1.26          intercept 
-11.6***   intercept  
1.22***      
0.500* 
LNGSIZE_SQ 
D(LNGSIZE_SQ) 
9.54 13.93 6.14 2.43 -1.18          intercept 
-11.6***   intercept 
1.20*** 
0.236 
LNCGDEBT 
D(LNCGDEBT) 
4.34 5.35 3.01 0.53 -1.10          intercept 
-7.32***   intercept  
1.01*** 
0.085 
LNKPC 
D(LNKPC) 
-3.46 -2.63 -4.21 0.418 -0.032      intercept           
-5.01***  intercept 
1.31*** 
0.138 
LNED_Attainment 
D(LNED_Attainment) 
2.24 2.60 1.38 0.309 -2.04         intercept 
-5.30***  intercept 
1.24*** 
0.262 
Rejection of Ho at 1% (5%) [10%] indicated by *** (**) [*] 
ADF uses Schwartz info criteria for automatic lag length selection (12 max); KPSS uses Barlett kernels with 
automatic Newey-West bandwidth selection.  
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